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A FAIR CROSS SECTION AND
DISTINCTIVENESS IN THE JURY
SELECTION PLAN FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
In criminal prosecutions the United States Constitution guarantees the
right to an indictment and trial by an impartial jury.' The Supreme
Court2 and Congress3 have unequivocally declared that an essential com-
ponent of this right is that selection of grand and petit juries be made from
a representative cross section of the community.
The fair cross section requirement means there is a constitutional enti-
tlement to a jury drawn from a venire constituting a fair cross section of the
community.' It does not mean that each jury panel must be made up of
representatives of all groups in the community.5 In accordance with the
Jury Selection Act's mandate, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia established and adopted the "Modified Plan for the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia for the Random
Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors" (D.C. Plan).6 Both the Jury Selection
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in relevant part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war or
public danger ... [nor be] deprived of life liberty, or property without due process
of law....
Amend. VI provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed .... "
2. For an example of Supreme Court acceptance of the fair cross section requirement,
see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
3. In the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (Jury Selection Act) Congress
stated: "[A]ll litigants in Federal court entitled to a trial by jury shall have the right to grand
and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district
or division wherein the court convenes." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1976 and Supp. V 1981).
4. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526.
5. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
6. The D.C. Plan establishes a jury commission for selecting potential jurors. The first
step in the selection process is to compile a source list from voter registration and motor
vehicle registration lists. From this pool, a master list of approximately 50,000 names is
compiled using a constant quotient. The number of names is then reduced to 10,000 in the
same manner and this constitutes the working list. Questionnaires are mailed to the persons
on the working list to determine if any are disqualified, exempt, or qualified to be excused
and have requested to be excused from any jury service. The names of persons in these
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Act and the D.C. Plan apply to the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia.'
The D.C. Plan provides that nurses, clergymen, teachers, attorneys, phy-
sicians, and dentists in active practice are excused from jury service upon
request.' The excuse provision is predicated upon a specific finding by the
District Court that jury service by such groups would entail undue hard-
ship or extreme inconvenience.9 This occupational excuse provision of the
D.C. Plan was challenged in D.C. Superior Court by various criminal de-
fendants on two grounds. First, the excuse provision violates the fifth and
sixth amendment rights to be indicted and tried by jurors chosen from a
fair cross section of the community. Second, it violates the requirements
and intent of the Jury Selection Act. ' 0 Although the D.C. Superior Court
ruled on this question some time ago," upholding the D.C. Plan, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed the question for the first
time in Sweet v. United States,'2 and affirmed the lower court's decision.
The exact question presented in Sweet has not been addressed by the
Supreme Court, but similar questions in prior Supreme Court cases pro-
vide the applicable framework and a sketchy rationale for the Sweet deci-
sion. In Taylor v. Louisiana,' 3 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction
because the Louisiana jury selection system violated the fair cross section
requirement of the sixth amendment. ' The system provided that a wo-
man could only be selected for jury service if she filed a written notice of
her willingness to serve on a jury.' 5 Without specifically disqualifying wo-
men from jury service, the Louisiana jury selection system had the effect of
categories are crossed off the list and the remaining names go on the qualified juror wheel
for service on a grand jury or petit jury. See Obregon v. United States, 423 A.2d 200, 203
(D.C. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981).
7. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1902 (1981).
8. The D.C. Plan also provides for excuse upon request for persons over the age of 70
years, persons who have served as grand or petit jurors in the District of Columbia within
the previous four years, persons required to care at home for young children or disabled
persons, and persons self-employed in a one-person business. Other categories, such as
members of the Armed Forces in active service and members of the fire and police depart-
ments, are totally exempted, as opposed to excused upon request, by § 1863(b)(6) of the Jury
Selection Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(6) (1976 and Supp. V 1981).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(5) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See infra note 38.
10. See supra notes I & 3.
11. United States v. Sutton, Daily Wash. L. Rep., Jan. 21, 1980, at 117, col. 3 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979). For the holding and reasoning in Sutton, see infra notes 29-43 and
accompanying text.
12. 449 A.2d 315 (D.C. 1982).
13. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
14. Id. at 531.
15. Id. at 523-24. This meant that although 53% of those qualified to serve on juries
were women, only 10% of those on the jury wheel were women. Even more striking is the
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systematically excluding women from jury venires. The Court decided
"women are sufficiently numerous and distinct from men" and, therefore,
their systematic exclusion from jury venires transgressed the fair cross sec-
tion requirement.' 6
In Duren v. Missouri, 7 the Supreme Court, interpreting the "numerous
and distinct" language of Taylor, enunciated a three-part test for establish-
ing a prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement. The
Duren Court stated that in order to succeed
the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be ex-
cluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the rep-
resentation of this group in venires from which juries are selected
is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such per-
sons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is
due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection
process. 8
The Missouri jury selection system, at issue in Duren, excused women
from jury service upon request. The Court held that the defendant had
shown a prima facie violation and the state had not rebutted the defend-
ant's prima facie case by showing that the "attainment of a fair cross sec-
tion [is] incompatible with a significant state interest."' 9 Therefore, the
system violated the fair cross section requirement.
The Ninth Circuit is the only federal court of appeals to have addressed
the question of occupational excuse provisions.2" The court upheld the
provisions for two reasons. First, the defendants had not shown that the
district court's finding of undue hardship or extreme inconvenience was
clearly erroneous.2' Second, the defendants had failed to satisfy the sec-
ond prong of the Duren test, that the groups are underrepresented. 22 Al-
though the court did not discuss the first prong of the Duren test,
distinctiveness, it did note "a surface incongruity ' 23 in the state's position
that the groups are distinctive enough to be excused from jury service and
fact that "during the period from Dec. 8, 1971 to Nov. 3, 1972, 12 females were among the
1,800 persons drawn to fill petit jury venires in St. Tammany Parish." Id
16. Id. at 531-32. The Court also quoted Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S.187, 193-94
(1946): "The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively
of one is different from a community composed of both. . . a flavor, a distinct quality is lost
if either sex is excluded." Id.
17. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
18. Id. at 364.
19. Id. at 368.
20. United States v. Goodlow, 597 F.2d 159 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 913 (1979).
21. Id at 161.
22. Id. at 162.
23. Id. at 162 n.1.
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yet are not distinctive enough for purposes of the cross section require-
ment. With only the skeletal Duren test and these rather unhelpful cases
as a guide, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled, for the first
time, on the issue of automatic excuses for members of particular occupa-
tional groups in Sweet v. United States.24
In Sweet, appellant was indicted by a grand jury and challenged the
District of Columbia Plan before trial by filing a motion to dismiss the
indictment.25 Instead of having an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the
parties agreed to adopt the record on this issue made in United States v.
Sutton26 before the same judge.2 7 The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss the indictment for the reasons given in Sutton.8
The Sutton trial court, in applying the Duren test, found the automatic
excuse provisions legal. The Sutton court decided there was under-
representation of members of the six occupations in the pool from which
jury panels are selected.29 The trial court also found the systematic exclu-
sion prong of the test had been satisfied since the underrepresentation was
"due to systematic exclusion of persons in those occupations from jury
service.- 3' The trial court reasoned that the automatic excuse, obtained by
merely checking a box on the questionnaire, encourages avoidance of jury
service and, therefore, the underrepresentation was inherent in the
system.3'
The Sutton court held that the distinctive group prong of the test was not
satisfied, however, since the members of the six occupations were not
shown to be a distinctive group in the community.32 The trial court con-
ceded that "[tihere is no bright beam of Constitutional light defining a
'distinctive group'" and that "[t]he criteria for determining distinctiveness
are evolving. '33 The court, therefore, looked at language from decisions in
24. 449 A.2d 315 (D.C. 1982).
25. The indictment included rape while armed, kidnapping while armed, assault with
intent to commit sodomy while armed, armed robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon,
and unauthorized use of a vehicle. Id. at 317.
26. Daily Wash. L. Rep., Jan. 21, 1980, at 117.
27. Judge Sylvia Bacon.
28. 449 A.2d at 322 n.13.
29. The members of the six occupations are automatically excused from jury service if
they check a box on the jury questionnaire. Judge Bacon considered the underrepresenta-
tion "significant" and "substantial." Daily Wash. L. Rep., Jan. 21, 1980, at 121-22.
30. Id at 121-22. The underrepresentation results from the system by which the quali-
fied juror wheel is constructed.
31. Id at 122.
32. Id. at 121.
33. Id at 122.
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the Ninth and Tenth Circuits for guidance. 34 These cases, however, pro-
vide no definition; the vague, tautological language in the cases indicates
that a group is distinctive when the group is cohesive, its interests cannot
be properly represented by other groups, and some attribute makes the
group identifiable.35 The Sutton court concluded that the evidence did not
establish that persons in the six occupations "have a cohesiveness of atti-
tude or a community of interest which is not represented by others in soci-
ety. '' 36 The court was not persuaded that ethical codes, the ability to
withhold judgment, and concern for client welfare and social service make
persons in the six occupations a distinctive group.37
The court also held that the D.C. Plan did not violate the Jury Selection
Act since section 1863(b)(5) of the Jury Selection Act authorizes automatic
excuses for members of occupational groups.38 The United States District
Court's finding of hardship and inconvenience was considered to be "in
accord with conventional wisdom" and with jury selection plans in many
other states.
39
Judge Bacon upheld the plan, saying "the letter of the law is met."40
Nonetheless, she criticized the law. In her view, the "traditional justifica-
tion"" for excusing these persons from jury service is not applicable to-
day.42 She was also unable to find a hardship, an inconvenience, or a
34. United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d
577 (10th Cir. 1976).
35. "[T]he essence of the cognizability requirement is the need to delineate an identifi-
able group, which in some objectively discernible and significant way, is distinct from the
rest of society, and whose interests cannot be adequately represented by other members of
the grand jury panel . . . . [Tlhe presence of some internal cohesion is significant." 552
F.2d at 904.
36. Daily Wash. L. Rep., Jan. 21, 1980, at 122.
37. Id. The court noted, however, that members of these occupations were previously
treated distinctively. They used to be exempt from jury service whereas now they are merely
excused upon request. Id
38. Section 1863(b)(5) provides:
[s]uch plan shall-. . . (5) specify those groups of persons or occupational classes
whose members shall, on individual request therefor, be excused from jury service.
Such groups or classes shall be excused only if the district court finds, and the plan
states, that jury service by such class or group would entail undue hardship or
extreme inconvenience to the members thereof, and excuse of members thereof
would not be inconsistent with sections 1861 and 1862 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(5) (1976 and Supp. V 1981).
39. Daily Wash. L. Rep., Jan. 21, 1980, at 122.
40. Id. at 123.
41. Judge Bacon did not identify the traditional justification but may have been refer-
ring to the idea that an uninterrupted performance of "particular occupations" was "critical
to the community welfare." 419 U.S. at 534. See also infra note 61.
42. Daily Wash. L. Rep., Jan. 21, 1980, at 117.
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community need to justify the automatic excuse. Judge Bacon urged the
United States District Court to "abolish occupational exemptions. . . un-
less there is an individual showing of substantial hardship."43
The appellate court in Sweet agreed with the holding of the trial court
that the distinctive group prong of the Duren test had not been satisfied."
The court also agreed that a Supreme Court definition of a distinctive
group did not exist. Therefore, the appeals court gleaned from Taylor and
Duren that a distinctive group should possess at least two characteristics.
First, "a distinctive group must possess a unique 'perspective on human
events' . . . not shared by other segments of society."45 Second, "a 'dis-
tinctive' group must be one of large size."46 The trial court discussed the
first characteristic, but did not mention the second.4 7
The Sweet court did not decide whether the occupational group was suf-
ficiently large4" because its holding was based on appellant's failure to
prove that the occupational group had a singular outlook on human
events.49 Appellant's inability to establish a prima facie violation of the
fair cross section requirement defeated the constitutional challenge.
Appellant's statutory challenge to the D.C. Plan was also rejected by the
Sweet court. Appellant argued that service as jurors does not subject
members of these occupations to undue hardship. ° The Sweet court held,
however, that there was a reasonable basis for this finding since the United
States District Court might reasonably have decided that members of the
occupational group would suffer financial hardship if they were not ex-
cused from jury service."1
Furthermore, section 1863(b)(5)"2 expressly permits excuse of categories
of persons in particular occupations without requiring a showing of indi-
43. Id
44. 449 A.2d at 325.
45. Id at 324 (citations omitted).
46. Id
47. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
48. The group constitutes 4.45% of the District of Columbia's population. 449 A.2d at
325.
49. The evidence showed that other groups in society shared the perspective of the
members of the occupational group. Id at 324.
50. See also supra notes 21, 38 & 39 and accompanying text.
51. "[M]embers of all of these occupational groups would have difficulty finding ade-
quate temporary substitutes or would incur extra work or financial losses even if substitutes
were obtained." 449 A.2d at 326. In a footnote, the Sweet court emphasized that these were
the types of "objective criteria" that should be used in making such findings. Id at 326 &
n.23.
52. See supra note 38.
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vidual hardship. 3 The Sweet court relied in part upon the legislative his-
tory of the Jury Selection Act to support the D.C. Plan.54
Both the trial and appellate courts rejected the constitutional challenge
to the D.C. Plan because the occupational group was not shown to be dis-
tinctive. Both courts attempted unsuccessfully to define the indefinite
statements concerning distinctiveness contained in prior law.55
In Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court, in determining that women
constituted a distinct group, mentioned a vague reason for its conclusion:
"a flavor, a distinct quality . . . is lost if either sex is excluded" from jury
venires." The Duren Court, although it formulated and applied the dis-
tinctive group prong of the test, merely quoted Taylor for the proposition
that women are a distinctive group.57 The Duren Court did not define or
elaborate on the analysis that should be used in determining distinctive-
ness for other groups. Due to this hazy concept of distinctiveness, other
courts have treated the distinctive group as synonymous with the large,
conspicuous, easily identifiable group. For example, the groups delineated
along racial, ethnic, or economic lines generally have been treated as dis-
tinctive." On the other hand, groups demarcated by residence in a partic-
ular area, age, or education, generally have not been considered
distinctive.59
Against this background, the decision and the reasoning in Sweet are
consistent with prior law since the occupational group is not large, conspic-
uous, or easily identifiable.6" Nevertheless, the Sweet decision does not
53. 449 A.2d at 326.
54. Id. The legislative history mentions doctors and ministers as appropriate occupa-
tional groups for excuse upon request. See H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1792, 1800.
55. See supra notes 16, 35 & 36 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 16. Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist denounced the majority's ap-
proach and noted an inconsistency:
This smacks more of mysticism than of law. The Court does not even purport to
practice its mysticism in a consistent fashion-presumably doctors, lawyers, and
other groups, whose frequent exemption from jury service is endorsed by the ma-
jority, also offer qualities as distinct and important as those at issue here.
419 U.S. at 542.
57. 439 U.S. at 364.
58. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (blacks); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954) (Hispanics); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (wage earners); Smith
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (blacks).
59. United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1979) (residence in a particular
area); United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1977) (age); United States v. Ross, 468
F.2d 1213 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973) (education); contra United States v.
Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding the less educated are a distinct group, as are
persons between the ages of 21 and 36 years).
60. However, United States v. Goodlow, 597 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1979), which dealt with
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clarify or define the distinctive group concept. Indeed, under the Sweet
court's analysis, even those groups that have been considered distinctive
may not be distinctive. For example, women, blacks, or Hispanics, regard-
less of age, education, or socioeconomic background, would not be ex-
pected to "possess a unique perspective on human events . . . not shared
by other segments of society" on all issues. 6 1
Courts still appear to be groping for a means of determining distinctive-
ness. The responsibility for that, however, cannot be laid at the door of the
Sweet court, which made a good faith attempt at applying an otherwise
illusory test. Until a more workable description of distinctiveness is for-
mulated, lower courts will probably continue to hand down decisions like
Sweet, if the group is not defined by race, sex, religion, or economic status.
This will be more likely to happen where the issue is excuse upon request
and not a total bar to serving on a jury, since these holdings do not result
in an egregious or extreme injustice.
Shaheda Sultan
the same issue as Sweet, points out an apparent inconsistency. See supra note 23 and accom-
panying text.
61. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. The Sweet decision is also consistent
with dicta in Taylor and Duren. The Taylor Court noted:
The states are free to grant exemptions from jury service to . . . those engaged in
particular occupations the uninterrupted performance of which is critical to the
community's welfare . . . . It would not appear that such exemptions would pose
substantial threats that the remaining pool of jurors would not be representative of
the community.
419 U.S. at 534. The Duren Court commented: "[Miost occupational and other reasonable
exemptions may inevitably involve some degree of overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness
.439 U.S. at 370 (emphasis added).
Another reason for the Sweet holding may be that the occupational excuse provision of
the D.C. Plan is apparently included, with some variations, in most of the jury selection
plans in the 94 federal judicial districts. W. GERWIN, W. STECKLER, & E. WEST, REPORT OF
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM TO EXAMINE "EXCUSE AND EX-
EMPTION PROVISIONS" IN DISTRICT COURT JURY PLANS (1974) (available through the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts). However, that report was written some
time ago and Judge Bacon noted a trend toward abolishing such provisions. Daily Wash. L.
Rep., Jan. 21, 1980, at 117.
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